Federal Financial Constitutions Compared

Paul Spahn

Chapter 3 in The Community Budget for an Economic and Monetary Union, 1993, pp 33-75 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The following chapter tries to evaluate some experiences from existing federations that may be useful for the discussion of the EC budget under EMU. An arc is drawn between two extreme models: one that puts regional constituencies at the mercy of the centre; and another that leaves the centre depending on the mercy of states. These two models are discussed in relation to the Australian and the EC experiences — although it is clear that history never obeys the Ideal typus of any model. The exercise demonstrates — among other things — that the notion ‘at the mercy’ is applicable neither to Australian nor to European federalism.

Keywords: Direct Democracy; Revenue Sharing; Revenue Source; Custom Duty; Fiscal Capacity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-37267-2_3

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230372672_3

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