Economies with Public Goods

Luis Corchon

Chapter 1 in The Theory of Implementation of Socially Optimal Decisions in Economics, 1996, pp 1-24 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract A public good is one for which there is non-rivalry in consumption, that is, if the good is consumed by individual i, this does not preclude individual j from consuming it. When there is neither exclusion nor free disposal a public good becomes a collective decision whose consequences affect the whole of society. Pure public goods are those whose quantity consumed by each member of the society is identical. It should be noted that a public good is a special sort of externality.

Keywords: Utility Function; Public Good; Optimal Decision; Constant Return; Private Good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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DOI: 10.1057/9780230372832_1

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