Implementation in Nash Equilibrium (I): General Results

Luis Corchon

Chapter 4 in The Theory of Implementation of Socially Optimal Decisions in Economics, 1996, pp 65-87 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we will study the implementation of social choice correspondences by means of Nash equilibria. As you will remember from the previous chapter, the motivation for studying this type of implementation is to obtain positive results by relaxing the concept of equilibrium: instead of requiring the equilibrium strategy for each agent to be a good response to any possible strategy of the other players, the Nash equilibrium requires it to be a good reply for those who constitute a good reply of the other players (see Definition 3, Chapter 2).

Keywords: Utility Function; Nash Equilibrium; Social Choice; Optimal Decision; Social Choice Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-37283-2_4

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230372832_4

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