Theories of Coalition Formation

Anatol Rapoport

Chapter 19 in Decision Theory and Decision Behaviour, 1998, pp 383-393 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract As we have seen, the main thrust of the theory of cooperative games has been based on the concept of a solution, typically represented by a set of imputations, that is, distributions of some collectively achieved gain among the players. The sum of the payoffs defining an imputation represents the most the players acting as a grand coalition can attain. It follows that the principal concern of this branch of game theory is with conflict resolution. The solution of a game represents, after all, the resolution of the conflicts of interests among the players. In the context of a normative theory, a solution of a game (in the form of an imputation) is rationalized as satisfying certain a priori stated principles of fairness or stability.

Keywords: Political Party; Coalition Formation; Coalition Structure; Grand Coalition; Policy Position (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-37776-9_20

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230377769_20

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