How to End Pay Leapfrogging (1990)

Richard Layard
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Richard Layard: London School of Economics and Political Science

Chapter 20 in Tackling Unemployment, 1999, pp 440-450 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract It is easy to see why uncoordinated bargaining has such bad effects. We can begin by looking at what it does to wages claims. In a decentralised bargain workers in one sector can, if successful, raise their wages relative to other wages and thus to the general price level. This will in the process also raise the relative price of what they produce, but the workers concerned will not mind this (provided the employment effects are not too severe).

Keywords: Productivity Growth; Wage Increase; Unit Labour Cost; Wage Bargaining; Income Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-37920-6_20

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230379206_20

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