Democracies and the Politics of Trade

Gary Shiffman

Chapter 5 in Economic Instruments of Security Policy, 2006, pp 75-100 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract If trade makes everyone better off, shouldn’t democratic governments embrace unqualified free trade? Empirically, they don’t—for reasons that differ from those at play in dictatorships. In this chapter we’ll explore the factors bearing on trade decisions in a democracy, opening with a prosaic reference and then moving to political reality. When we understand the theory and practice of trade in a democracy, we will apply our understanding to national security.

Keywords: Free Trade; National Security; Trade Agreement; Free Trade Agreement; Most Favored Nation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1057/9780230505377_6

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