Brian G. M. Main on the Question of Executive Pay

Geoffrey Owen, Tom Kirchmaier () and Jeremy Grant
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Geoffrey Owen: Interdisciplinary Institute of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science
Jeremy Grant: Graduate Institute of International Studies

Chapter 11 in Corporate Governance in the US and Europe, 2006, pp 65-69 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Current executive compensation appears to be structured suboptimally in many ways. This is partly the outcome of the inefficient use of stock options, which are undervalued by both executives and the board; the overreliance on extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation, and structural weaknesses in the compensation negotiation process. In empirical research and in the practical design of compensation, a more holistic approach is needed – one that takes into account the underlying assumptions of design, the prevalent institutional influences, and the psychology of human motivation.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Intrinsic Motivation; Stock Option; Extrinsic Motivation; Executive Compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-51245-0_11

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230512450_11

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