Andrei Shleifer asks Is There a Major Problem with Corporate Governance in the United States?

Geoffrey Owen, Tom Kirchmaier () and Jeremy Grant
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Geoffrey Owen: Interdisciplinary Institute of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science
Jeremy Grant: Graduate Institute of International Studies

Chapter 17 in Corporate Governance in the US and Europe, 2006, pp 91-95 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The distinction between civil law and common law countries comes down to the question of who has the ultimate trust of society, lawmakers (legislators) or law enforcers (judges). It is argued that common law, which puts much more trust in law enforcers and gives much greater discretion to the courts, is better placed to protect shareholders, and so fosters the development of efficient capital markets. The current tendency under Sarbanes-Oxley for more prescriptive capital market rules might be counterproductive.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Minority Shareholder; Executive Compensation; Private Enforcement; Earning Manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-51245-0_17

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230512450_17

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