Roberta Romano on Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in the US

Geoffrey Owen, Tom Kirchmaier () and Jeremy Grant
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Geoffrey Owen: Interdisciplinary Institute of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science
Jeremy Grant: Graduate Institute of International Studies

Chapter 8 in Corporate Governance in the US and Europe, 2006, pp 52-56 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Public sector funds like CalPERS and NYCERS are the most activist investors in the US. They mainly employ voting initiatives to make their voice heard. However, empirical studies demonstrate that such initiatives have no impact on corporate performance; in cases where funds are entitled to subsidies for their voting initiatives they actually destroy – on average — shareholder value.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Institutional Investor; Pension Fund; Executive Compensation; Investor Activism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-51245-0_8

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230512450_8

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