Alastair Ross Goobey on Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance — a UK Perspective

Geoffrey Owen, Tom Kirchmaier () and Jeremy Grant
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Geoffrey Owen: Interdisciplinary Institute of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science
Jeremy Grant: Graduate Institute of International Studies

Chapter 9 in Corporate Governance in the US and Europe, 2006, pp 57-60 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In the UK, both public and private sector funds are more engaged in pragmatic investor activism as compared to the US, as they do not face the same conflicts of interests. Unlike in the US, British pension fund trustees are legally independent, and are not an extension of the CFO’s office. Dialogues between shareholders and firms take place in the context of the ‘nuclear option’, the right of shareholders of calling an extraordinary general meeting within three weeks with 10 per cent of the votes.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Institutional Investor; Pension Fund; Institutional Shareholder; British Telecom (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-51245-0_9

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230512450_9

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