The Global Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration in the Presence of Capital Mobility

Chisato Yoshida () and Alan Woodland

Chapter 3 in The Economics of Illegal Immigration, 2005, pp 55-66 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Using the Bond and Chen (1987) model of illegal immigration, we re-examine the effects of internal enforcement by the host country’s government on the welfare of the host (labor-importing) country, the foreign (labor-exporting) country and the world, when capital is internationally mobile between countries. Our main result is that the internal enforcement policy increases the foreign country’s welfare and global welfare and, under certain conditions, increases the host country’s welfare. Therefore, we conclude that enforcement is a Pareto-improving policy potentially.

Keywords: Host Country; Foreign Country; Domestic Firm; Capital Mobility; Illegal Immigration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-51488-1_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9780230514881

DOI: 10.1057/9780230514881_3

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().