The Welfare Effects of Financing the Internal Enforcement of Illegal Immigration

Chisato Yoshida () and Alan Woodland

Chapter 5 in The Economics of Illegal Immigration, 2005, pp 78-93 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The present chapter re-examines the Bond and Chen (1987) model on illegal immigration, introducing a government budget constraint (GBC) on the host country’s government. It examines the effects of financing internal enforcement of illegal immigration by the host-country’s government on the welfare of the host (labor-importing) country, the foreign (labor-exporting) country and the world, both in the absence and in the presence of international capital mobility. The aim of this chapter is to determine whether internal enforcement may be a Pareto-improving policy.

Keywords: Host Country; Welfare Effect; Domestic Firm; Domestic Worker; Capital Mobility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-51488-1_5

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230514881_5

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