Unemployment, International Migration and Profit-Sharing

Chisato Yoshida () and Alan Woodland

Chapter 8 in The Economics of Illegal Immigration, 2005, pp 129-142 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract We develop the standard (two-country, one-good, two-factor) model of international immigration, in which we have unemployment in the host (capital abundant) country and in the foreign (labor abundant) country. Our main result is that the introduction of a profit-sharing plan by the host country causes: (1) Employment of domestic labor increases, (2) immigration decreases, (3) the domestic (foreign) country’s welfare rises (falls), and, under certain circumstances, (4) global welfare rises in the presence of international capital immobility.

Keywords: Host Country; Foreign Country; Foreign Capital; Capital Mobility; Domestic Labor (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-51488-1_8

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230514881_8

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