International Migration, Profit-Sharing and National Welfare

Chisato Yoshida () and Alan Woodland

Chapter 9 in The Economics of Illegal Immigration, 2005, pp 143-162 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract We develop a two-country model of international migration with unemployment in order to examine the welfare effects of a profit-sharing scheme implemented in the host country. Assuming the absence of international capital mobility, our results show that an increase in the rate of profit-sharing has the following effects. (1) It reduces the wages of domestic and migrant workers who compete with each other for employment; (2) it increases the number of immigrants in the host country; (3) it lowers unemployment rates in both countries; (4) it raises the profits of domestic firms; and (5) it increases domestic and foreign welfare.

Keywords: National Welfare; Host Country; Minimum Wage; Foreign Country; International Migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-51488-1_9

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230514881_9

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