The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery

H. Scott Gordon

Chapter 9 in Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, 1954, pp 178-203 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The chief aim of this paper is to examine the economic theory of natural resource utilization as it pertains to the fishing industry. It will appear, I hope, that most of the problems associated with the words “conservation” or “depletion” or “overexploitation” in the fishery are, in reality, manifestations of the fact that the natural resources of the sea yield no economic rent. Fishery resources are unusual in the fact of their common-property nature; but they are not unique, and similar problems are encountered in other cases of common-property resource industries, such as petroleum production, hunting and trapping, etc. Although the theory presented in the following pages is worked out in terms of the fishing industry, it is, I believe, applicable generally to all cases where natural resources are owned in common and exploited under conditions of individualistic competition.

Keywords: Public Choice; Land Tenure; Fishing Effort; Biological Literature; Marine Biological Association (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1954
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-52321-0_10

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230523210_10

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