 Governance in Family-Owned Hong Kong CorporationsJudy S. L. Tsui and Vanessa Stott Chapter 3 in The Governance of East Asian Corporations, 2004, pp 54-70 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract In 1997, Hong Kong’s sovereignty reverted to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) has retained its common law system.1 As such, and following La Porta et al.’s (1998) empirical findings, Hong Kong should offer relatively better investor protection than the jurisdictions in this book which have civil law systems. Further, a key characteristic in Hong Kong is that most of the large companies are family-owned. SCMP (2000) has argued that family owned firms in Hong Kong are subject to fewer typical agency problems than non-family firms. The challenge for Hong Kong’s regulators, as pointed out by Tsui and Shieh (2004), is to implement effective corporate governance measures which recognize the importance of concentrated ownership and yet balance the interests of controlling and minority shareholders. In this chapter we outline Hong Kong’s position in terms of ownership, regulatory provisions and various corporate governance reforms that the government has instituted. Keywords: Corporate Governance; Institutional Investor; Audit Committee; Minority Shareholder; Generally Accept Account Principle (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-52327-2_3 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.