 Intentional PsychologiesGordon R. Foxall Chapter Chapter 4 in Explaining Consumer Choice, 2007, pp 65-80 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract Juarrero is not entirely fair to behaviorists, whose aim was only ever to predict and control behavior rather than to explain it any further; nor has the behaviorist denied that internal change at the physiological level accompanies our learning. But the explanation of such behavior requires, as we have seen, some inference or other about intentionality. Dennett (1969) proposed a plausible scheme for the scientificallycompatible ascription of the necessary content but the clearcut distinction on which that early work was based has become clouded in his later writings. Indeed, having drawn the personal/sub-personal division so vividly and usefully in Content and Consciousness, Dennett subsequently loosened the argument that content was ascribable only at the personal level of non-mechanical explanation, and proposed that mechanistic sub-personal systems may be treated as intentional systems in their own right via the ascription of content that permits their prediction. Dennett’s introduction of the idea of sub-personal cognitive psychology is a particular source of confusion of his original personal/sub-personal dichotomy. Keywords: Intentional System; Personal Level; Folk Psychology; Intentional Content; Intentional Stance (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-59979-6_4 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
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