Public Choice Theory and Smart Sanctions

Robert Eyler

Chapter Chapter 4 in Economic Sanctions, 2007, pp 59-84 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Sanctions are seen throughout the world as blunt diplomatic instruments, potentially causing collateral damage to an innocent populace as a penalty for its government’s actions. This belief is exactly correct. Economic statecraft attempts to influence current or potential disenfranchisement, providing incentives for the target’s people to demand political change. Sanctions simultaneously attempt to influence interest groups within the target economy to rise up, either through a political process or more violently, against the target’s policies or rulers. How much are common citizens hurt by these policies? Is the sender’s populace harmed such that those groups that influence sender decisions pressure for sanction’s end? Do the payoffs to sender interest groups exceed the cost to humanity?

Keywords: Interest Group; Public Choice; Security Council; Policy Market; Market Reaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61000-2_4

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230610002_4

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