Domestic Politics and the Supply of Subsidies

Nikolaos Zahariadis

Chapter Chapter 5 in State Subsidies in the Global Economy, 2008, pp 79-102 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Having explored the demand side of the subsidy equation, I now turn to the domestic politics of translating demands into more producer subsidies. Producer groups may demand more subsidies, but are policy-makers willing to supply them? I amend and elaborate the institutional aspects of the G-H model, namely the impact of political power and national institutions on the government’s ability to provide subsidies. The literature on trade policy is replete with references to the importance of institutions (e.g., Mansfield and Busch, 1995; O’Reilly, 2005; Henisz and Mansfield, 2006). What is missing is a model that incorporates this variable within a broader picture of the policy process.

Keywords: Political Power; Electoral System; Veto Player; Veto Power; Campaign Contribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61051-4_5

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230610514_5

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