Actuarial Forecasts: The Reform’s Distributional Consequences

Charles M. Becker, Grigori A. Marchenko, Sabit Khakimzhanov, Ai-Gul S. Seitenova and Vladimir Ivliev

Chapter 10 in Social Security Reform in Transition Economies, 2009, pp 201-227 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Akey issue that is often downplayed concerns the distributional impact of moving from a Solidarity system to an Accumulative system. Perhaps this is not surprising: the initial focus tends to be survival-oriented, identifying forces and problems that could cause the new system to crash, and making sure that the potential fiscal burden during transition is not overwhelming. Nor were distributional issues important in the initial wave of Accumulative system adoptions in Latin America for the simple reason that countries like Chile were not welfare states to begin with. In these countries, there was neither an initial commitment to ensure adequate standards for the poor in general, nor a particular commitment to the elderly, disabled, and rural poor. Thus, the individual account system was something of a bonus (that one paid for) rather than the replacement of a birthright.

Keywords: Minimum Wage; Real Wage; Transition Economy; Average Wage; Labor Force Participation Rate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-61802-2_10

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230618022_10

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