Learning and Imitation by Theocracies

Amihai Glazer

Chapter 9 in The Political Economy of Theocracy, 2009, pp 203-211 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract A fruitful approach in the analysis of democracy is to view each voter as aiming to maximize his utility, and candidates who want to maximize the chances of winning election. These assumptions form the basis of the Downsian model. In contrast, a dictator can be viewed as maximizing power (see Wintrobe, 1998). Ideological regimes, such as perhaps some communist ones, may aim to maximize the number of people believing in its ideology (see Bernholz, 2001). This view may accord with our view of some theocracies. But theocracy may involve more than substituting one objective for another. True believers, for example, may want to do God’s will, fearing great punishment if they do not.

Keywords: Good Policy; Policy Space; Yardstick Competition; True Believer; Ideological Regime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-62006-3_10

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230620063_10

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