Endgames — Termination Scenarios in the Last Stage of an IJV Life Cycle

Ursula F. Ott

Chapter 7 in International Joint Ventures, 2006, pp 160-179 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Suppose the situation of a three-player IJV-model (i = foreign firm, local firm and IJV), the impact of their different utility functions (ui = uFor, uLoc, uIJV) on the management and the efforts of the IJV board of directors may lead to success or failure of the business endeavor. The actions (ci = cFor, cLoc and cIJV) chosen to contribute to the success or failure of the IJV have to be considered too. Different strategic behavior occurs in the long run of an IJV. Developing a reputation over the special stages and considering learning of the players, the co-operative aspect of the joint enterprise in the beginning of the endgame scenario has to be taken as a prerequisite of the game. Apart from focusing on the several reasons, which may lead to the difficulties in managing the joint venture, the abstraction of the problem might provide solution concepts.

Keywords: Joint Venture; Moral Hazard; Incentive Scheme; Repeated Game; International Joint Venture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-62546-4_7

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230625464_7

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