Explaining Activism (2): Determinants of Choice

Han-Kyun Rho
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Han-Kyun Rho: Brunel University

Chapter 3 in Shareholder Activism, 2007, pp 26-35 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Apart from a situation shareholders may regard as being unsatisfactory or unfair, the second approach addresses why activists finally choose the option of activism to ameliorate the problematic situation. A question, therefore, would be under what conditions activism prevails over other corrective actions (Hirschman, 1970). Based on collective action theory and expected utility theory, the second approach investigates factors which make dissident shareholders favor activism.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Institutional Investor; Pension Fund; Institutional Ownership; Large Shareholder (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-62582-2_3

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230625822_3

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