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Illiberal and Successful? In Search of Sustainable Regional Growth in Authoritarian States

Janerik Gidlund

Chapter 17 in Asia-Pacific Transitions, 2001, pp 239-254 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract This chapter is a comparative study of two industrial parks: one in Batam in Indonesia and one in Suzhou, China. Both parks have been created by Singapore in cooperation with the host governments. Above all, they are political efforts to solve important institutional problems common in authoritarian states in East Asia, such as the unpredictability of administrative procedures, the instability in the rules of the market, and the corruption associated with involuntary joint ventures. These parks are interesting in that they represent a possible approach for authoritarian states to the problem of how to combine a rather closed society with institutions that are favorable for the development of an open economy. The industrial parks can thus be viewed as a way of coping with the challenges posed by an internationalizing economy.

Keywords: Transition Theory; Global Trading; Regional Cooperation; Physical Infrastructure; Industrial Park (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-62845-8_17

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230628458_17

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