Conclusion: Implementation Failures

A. S. Bhalla
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A. S. Bhalla: University of Cambridge

Chapter 7 in Market or Government Failures?, 2001, pp 162-174 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The bulk of the literature on contracts and transaction costs invariably assumes enforcement and implementation as given, ‘assuming either that it is perfect or that it is constantly imperfect’ (North, 1990, p. 54). In practice, the structure of enforcement mechanisms would influence the outcome. Two main reasons may explain limitations in enforcement. Firstly, the behaviour of enforcement agents is relevant; their own utility function may conflict with enforcement. Secondly, the cost of contract enforcement may be too high especially in developing countries char­acterized by the lack of adequate institutions or the existence of poorly functioning ones. In these countries, institutional imperfections may also be reflected in the misuse of legal instruments, rules and regula­tions.

Keywords: Civil Servant; State Enterprise; Real Effective Exchange Rate; Asian Crisis; Government Failure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-62920-2_7

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DOI: 10.1057/9780230629202_7

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