 Competition and Market PowerArve Halseth and Per Ingvar Olsen Chapter 4 in Electricity Market Reform in Norway, 2000, pp 80-99 from Palgrave Macmillan Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, we focus on the abilities of electricity generators to exercise market power in the Norwegian and the Nordic electricity markets. The analysis is based primarily on non-co-operative cartel theory involving the use of standard game-theoretical models, with references to more complex extensions of the standard models and computerised simulations based on such models. The more complex models are needed for the discussion of the implications of stochastic variation in both demand and generating capacity in the hydropower system, whereas the simulation studies have been applied to discussions about the possibilities of exercising market power in an integrated Nordic electricity market. Basically, we assume that the ability to gain from co-ordinated behaviour on the side of the generators is dependent on a sufficient inelasticity of demand, which permits an increase of revenues through reducing the volumes supplied. The ability actually to carry out such actions successfully, however, is seen as depending largely on structural market conditions. Keywords: Market Power; Electricity Market; Large Market Share; Perfect Competition; Cartel Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-333-98274-7_4 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.