A Dollar is a Dollar: Solution to the Paradox of Interpersonal Cardinal Utility

Yew-Kwang Ng ()

Chapter 6 in Efficiency, Equality and Public Policy, 2000, pp 82-98 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract As explained in Chapter 2, the impossibility theorems of Arrow (1951/1963), Kemp and Ng (1976), Parks (1976), and Sen (1969, 1970a) prove, and even just common-sense arguments demonstrate, that interpersonal comparisons of cardinal utility are necessary for making social choice which cannot reasonably be based on individual ordinal preferences only.

Keywords: Distributional Weight; Income Taxation; Preferential Treatment; Disincentive Effect; Redistributive Effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-333-99277-7_6

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DOI: 10.1057/9780333992777_6

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