Corporate Governance Convergence in Japan

Christina L. Ahmadjian

Chapter 6 in The Convergence of Corporate Governance, 2012, pp 117-136 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Corporate governance in post-war Japan contrasted sharply with the Anglo-American system. Insiders dominated boards of directors. Main banks, business partners, and other friendly shareholders held shares of publicly traded firms, protecting them from the threat of hostile takeover. Firms relied on close and long-term relationships with main banks for financing. Corporate executives strove to balance the needs and demands of employees, suppliers, buyers, customers and sodety, and saw the company as a community — rather than a means to maximize shareholder value (Dore, 2000; Learmount, 2002; Schaede, 1994). It is not that firms ignored their shareholders; rather, share-holders were buyers, suppliers, banks, and other long-term partners, interested in the long-term health of the firm rather than short-term investment gains.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Independent Director; Audit Committee; Stock Option; Board Size (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-02956-0_6

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137029560_6

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