Patterns of Multinational Enterprise—State Interactions in International Business

Yorgos Rizopoulos and Dimitrios Sergakis

Chapter Chapter 6 in Mergers and Acquisitions as the Pillar of Foreign Direct Investment, 2012, pp 81-95 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract International business strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs), and of merger and acquisitions (M&A) operations in particular, are not based solely on competitive, localization or ownership advantages. Political leverage determines the opportunities and, consequently, the goals that an MNE can set and implies an eventually discriminatory access to some resources, including target firms. In this sense, privileged political leverage—as a positive-sum cooperative game involving a limited number of connected and interdependent public and private actors—could improve a firm’s performance at the expense of competitors and other actors (Economakis, Rizopoulos, and Sergakis 2010).

Keywords: Host Country; Bargaining Power; Private Actor; Multinational Enterprise; Structural Hole (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-03155-6_6

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137031556_6

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