Accountability and Independence of Data Protection Authorities — A Trade-Off?

Philip Schütz

Chapter 11 in Managing Privacy through Accountability, 2012, pp 233-260 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract This contribution aims to shed light on central features of data protection authorities (DPAs)1 such as their independence and accountability. Since there is little systematic and long-term research on DPAs from a political science perspective, the theoretical foundations of and empirical findings about independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) can help to serve as a template model providing a framework for the analysis of DPAs.

Keywords: European Union; Central Bank; Data Protection; European Union Directive; Data Protection Authority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-03222-5_12

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137032225_12

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