Perpetuating the Regulatory Order in the Credit Rating Industry

Benjamin Taupin

Chapter 4 in Finance: The Discreet Regulator, 2012, pp 85-109 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract The subprime crisis put the spotlight on the debate over the credit rating agencies (CRAs) system. Questions had already emerged following the cumulative effects of the role played by CRAs in a number of crises involving credit ratings: the Mexican crisis (1994–5), the Asian crisis (1997–8), the default by Argentina (2002) and the corporate bankruptcies of the early 2000s (Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat). But since 2006, rating agencies have been more widely criticized for their role in the subprime financial crisis, particularly for assigning top ratings to mortgage-backed securities and other financial instruments which later turned out to be toxic assets, or for failing to take the measure of the threats hanging over A-rated firms (AIG, Lehman Brothers) shortly before their collapse.

Keywords: Credit Default Swap; Credit Spread; Credit Rating Agency; Full Comment; Regulatory Order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-03360-4_5

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137033604_5

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