Redenomination Risk Following a Euro Breakup

Dimitris N. Chorafas

Chapter 8 in Breaking Up the Euro, 2013, pp 171-194 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract When in the 1990s the decision was made about a common currency among qualifying member states of the European Union, no particular attention was paid to the need for longer-term fiscal discipline. The Stability and Growth Pact was, from the start, a “nice chaps” document, weighting about 1 percent when compared to the 100 percent of rules necessary for fiscal union and common currency stability requirements. In the 1990s, Euroland’s member states rejected a biting fiscal discipline because they were afraid that it would: Take discretion away from them Precommit them to austerity measures during tough times, and Expose the malfunctions in their fiscal, economic, and financial systems.

Keywords: Member State; Monetary Policy; Fiscal Policy; Member Country; Mutual Fund (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33229-5_8

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9781137332295

DOI: 10.1057/9781137332295_8

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().