The Emergence of Cooperation

Matteo Morini

Chapter 12 in Agent-based Models of the Economy, 2015, pp 198-207 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma model (first formalized in Tucker and Luce (1959)) is introduced — but with an additional, non-participation, option. A stochastic term perturbates the participating agents expected payoff: a cheating strategy, in the limit, is however dominated by a cooperative strategy, but during every round the advantage is only theoretical (the expected cooperating value exceeds defection), given by a probability distribution which favors cooperators.

Keywords: Cooperative Strategy; Exploratory Phase; Stochastic Term; Round Figure; Cheat Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-33981-2_12

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137339812_12

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