Corruption Reform, Equilibrium Selection, and the Institutional Entrepreneur

R. Isaac and Douglas A. Norton
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Douglas A. Norton: Florida State University

Chapter 3 in Just the Facts Ma’am: A Case Study of the Reversal of Corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department, 2013, pp 20-35 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract This work is intended to be what has been called an “analytical narrative;” that is, it is a presentation of a specific, naturally occurring circumstance but with the analysis examined through the lens of a strategic economic model. The core of our model, corruption reform modeled as an equilibrium selection problem, is presented in the first two sections. We then describe in greater detail many of the policies William Parker implemented in his reform drive in the Los Angeles Police Department. We close the chapter by relating his policies back to our model.

Keywords: Police Officer; Police Force; Police Department; Coordination Problem; Coordination Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-35439-6_3

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137354396_3

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