Managerial Biases in Corporate Policy

Adam Szyszka

Chapter Chapter 8 in Behavioral Finance and Capital Markets, 2013, pp 197-215 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In the previous chapter it was taken for granted that corporate managers act fully rationally and adopt their decisions to temporary market inefficiencies and investor biases. In this chapter we take a different approach and assume that managers, similar to investors, may behave in less than fully rational ways.

Keywords: Loss Aversion; Offer Price; Behavioral Finance; Initial Valuation; Derivative Position (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-36629-0_9

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137366290_9

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