Combining Financial and Psychological Insights for a New Typology of Ownership

Katarina Sikavica and Amy J. Hillman

Chapter Chapter 2 in Shareholder Empowerment, 2015, pp 35-61 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Since the work of Berle and Means (1932), organizational scholars have recognized that the interests of “owners” of a firm may differ from those of management. Agency theory research has a long tradition of focusing on these potentially different interests (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Scholars also recognize that “owners” can be a diverse mix of different types of investors and have provided typologies of these different “types” (e.g., Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988; Bushee, 1998; Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010; David, O’Brien, Yoshikawa, & Delios, 2010). However, most of these typologies still remain mired in agency theory assumptions of economic rationality and purely financial motivation.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Institutional Investor; Management Journal; Hedge Fund; Strategic Management Journal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-37393-9_2

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137373939_2

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