Less Likely to Fail: Sharper Supervision

Thomas F. Huertas

Chapter 3 in Safe to Fail, 2014, pp 50-81 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Stronger regulation is not the only reason banks will become less likely to fail. Sharper supervision will play a role as well, both at the level of the individual firm and at the system as a whole. With respect to micro-prudential (individual firm) supervision, the authorities have become more forward-looking and more pro-active, making judgements on firms’ business models and strategies and on firms’ ability to execute their chosen strategy successfully. The authorities have also introduced a new concept, macro-prudential (economy-wide) supervision. Here, the authorities aim to analyse the system as whole, asssess the risks to financial stability and devise measures to mitigate these risks, including the risks that may arise from non-bank financial institutions and from shadow banking. Together, these supervisory measures reinforce regulatory reform and should make banks less likely to fail.

Keywords: Central Bank; Inside Trading; Monetary Policy Committee; Loss Give Default; Risk Appetite (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-38365-5_4

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137383655_4

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