Banking Secrecy and International Financial Markets

Donato Masciandaro () and Olga Balakina
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Olga Balakina: Bocconi University

Chapter 3 in Banking Secrecy and Global Finance, 2015, pp 183-222 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In Chapter 2 we analyzed the economics and politics of banking secrecy, given a situation in which the policymaker decides to be compliant (i.e. the policymaker aims to prevent and combat banking secrecy). Now we can discuss the macroeconomic effects if the policymaker faces the risks of being noncompliant. The noncompliant attitude can produce effects on the capital flows if we assume the existence of international sanctions against banking secrecy.

Keywords: Rich Country; Capital Flow; Institutional Quality; Capital Inflow; Banking Secrecy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-40010-9_4

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137400109_4

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