Conclusion: The Mystery of International Legal Obligation

Paul Hallwood and Thomas J. Miceli
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Thomas J. Miceli: University of Connecticut

Chapter 9 in Maritime Piracy and Its Control: An Economic Analysis, 2015, pp 115-122 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract This chapter investigates the nature of International Public Law (IPL) and asks why it continues to permit certain types of lawless behavior like maritime piracy to persist. The proposed answer is that IPL is to a large extent voluntary in the sense that countries can choose whether or not to enforce it, and there is little consequence of choosing not to do so. The extent to which some enforcement does occur is because countries like the United States have a sufficiently large stake in maintaining order that they will unilaterally expend the necessary resources, while other countries will be content to free-ride on those efforts. At present, this appears to be the case with regard to the control of maritime piracy.

Keywords: Moral Obligation; Vienna Convention; Maritime Piracy; International Public Good; Arbitration Commission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-46150-6_9

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137461506_9

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