Beyond Surveillance: Reducing the Risk of Financial Crises

Paul E. Atkinson

Chapter 5 in The Limits of Surveillance and Financial Market Failure, 2014, pp 77-87 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Chapter 1 points to the limits of surveillance by international organizations, even when the surveillance is well done. It calls attention, in particular, to three forces which will be at work regardless of however much the institutions improve their own analysis and oversight1: limits that governments impose on surveillance by international institutions in their “shareholding” capacity, as well as self-restraint by the institutions (“sanitization”, self-censorship); the reluctance of elected governments to face up to the implications of warnings and alerts if this would be politically unattractive; the failure of markets to discipline policies that permit macroeconomic, fiscal or financial imbalances due, at least in part, to poor assessments of available information, including “sanitized” surveillance reports.

Keywords: European Central Bank; International Financial Reporting Standard; European Banking Authority; Single Supervisory Mechanism; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-47147-5_5

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137471475_5

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