Selection of an Auction Form

Gregor Berz

Chapter 7 in Game Theory Bargaining and Auction Strategies, 2015, pp 103-117 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Why did the company for awarding the cafeteria construction project1 select a Dutch auction as negotiation form? It is not very easy for an auctioneer in individual cases to decide which of the four auction forms produces the best result. The Dutch auction essentially provides the same result as a first-price-sealed-bid auction, that is, the highest bid in the form “indifference price plus strategic margin”. On the other hand, a second-price-sealed-bid auction and an English auction are second-price auctions. They both provide the second-best indifference price as final result.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1057/9781137475428_8

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