From decay to governance in the public interest

Dag Detter and Stefan Fölster

Chapter Chapter 14 in The Public Wealth of Nations, 2015, pp 196-198 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Francis Fukuyama (2014a) provides a lucid account of the failings of state governance in his essay “America in decay.” Many of his observations corroborate our description of how state-owned wealth is mismanaged in many countries. Fukuyama writes: Distrust of government then perpetuates and feeds on itself. Distrust of executive agencies leads to demands for more legal checks on administration, which reduces the quality and effectiveness of government. At the same time demand for government services induces Congress to impose new mandates on the executive, which often prove difficult, if not impossible, to fulfill. Both processes lead to a reduction of bureaucratic autonomy, which in turn leads to rigid, rule-bound, uncreative and incoherent government.

Keywords: Central Bank; Pension Fund; State Governance; Executive Agency; Public Pension Fund (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-51986-3_14

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137519863_14

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