Politicians as consumer advocates instead of quasi-capitalists

Dag Detter and Stefan Fölster

Chapter Chapter 5 in The Public Wealth of Nations, 2015, pp 63-71 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Most would agree that the public wealth could be managed better. This book, however, makes a much more far-reaching claim. Better institutions to govern public wealth can improve democracy and make it easier for politicians and administrators to represent their citizens rather than succumb to pressure from all those striving to share in the spoils of public wealth. In this chapter, we will illustrate how public monopolies can potentially give consumers much better services, if politics was more concerned with citizen welfare and less with protecting SOEs. This also requires that SOEs must be regulated on a par with private firms. One illustration is the way airports, airlines, and traffic control are handled in many countries.

Keywords: World Trade Organization; Supervisory Board; Postal Service; Generally Accept Accounting Principle; Federal Aviation Administration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-51986-3_5

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137519863_5

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