Coordination Games

Maríapaz Espinosa and Penélope Hernández

Chapter 4 in Experimental Economics, 2015, pp 53-71 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we focus on strategic situations, which fall under the umbrella of coordination games. Both in daily life and in the world of economics there are numerous situations in which we are required to coordinate with friends, professors, colleagues, other firms, etc. Coordination may sometimes appear to be an easy task, but yet in some cases, regardless of their importance, it can be elusive because certain features hinder the possibility of the agents’ coordinating their actions. Why do such coordination failures take place? What promotes or inhibits the human capacity to coordinate? This will be the subject matter of this chapter.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Focal Point; Pure Strategy; Coordination Problem; Payoff Matrix (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-53819-2_4

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137538192_4

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