Social Preferences

Antonio Cabrales and Giovanni Ponti ()

Chapter 6 in Experimental Economics, 2015, pp 87-104 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract In the light of a vast amount of theoretical and experimental research, many economists are already used to the idea that people hold social (that is, interdependent) preferences. This opinion has been influenced by an abundant literature showing how experimental subjects, using classical experimental protocols, act as though they are attempting to maximize an objective function through which, in addition to their self-interest, they also take into account the wellbeing of other individuals participating in the experiment.

Keywords: Social Preference; Ultimatum Game; Dictator Game; Inequality Aversion; Monetary Payoff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-137-53819-2_6

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.palgrave.com/9781137538192

DOI: 10.1057/9781137538192_6

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Palgrave Macmillan Books from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().