Independence of State Audit

Joseph Pois

Chapter 4 in State Audit, 1981, pp 70-82 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract There is such widespread acceptance of independence as a sine qua non of state audit that there seems to be little point to engage in the academic exercise of marshaling the arguments in support of this proposition. More than a decade ago, Normanton cogently observed: “Since the time of Aristotle it has been accepted principle that state auditors should be free from direction, influence and intimidation by, and income or reward from, the authorities and persons whose affairs they are called upon to audit.”1 This analysis seeks to focus upon the implementation of the concept of state audit independence; in order to minimize redundancy, it deals only incidentally with such facets as the auditor’s selection and security of tenure and similar subjects that have been explored at length in the writings of others.

Keywords: Comptroller General; Executive Branch; State Audit; State Auditor; Legislative Body (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1981
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-04666-9_4

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