Politometrics of Government Behavior in A Democracy

Bruno Frey

A chapter in Measurement in Public Choice, 1981, pp 167-181 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract One of the major developments in Public Choice has been that of politico-economic models that empirically study the mutual interaction between the economy and the polity (“politometrics”). Government is taken as having a monopolistic position and as maximizing its own utility subject to restrictions, in particular the reelection constraint. Voters evaluate government’s performance via elections and popularity surveys, having as their main criterium a satisfactory state of the economy. Politometric estimates for several countries and periods are presented and the politico-economic models’ performance is compared to that of traditional econometric models. The research may be fruitfully extended in various directions.

Keywords: Public Choice; Vote Share; Percentage Point Increase; Congressional Election; Political Business Cycle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1981
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-05090-1_12

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-05090-1_12

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