An Experimental Comparison of Three Public Good Decision Mechanisms

Vernon Smith ()

A chapter in Measurement in Public Choice, 1981, pp 57-74 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Three public good mechanisms, all sharing the characteristics of collective excludability, unanimity and budget balance, are compared: The mechanisms differ in ways that are hypothesized to effect free-riding behavior with the Auction mechanism expected to show the least, and the Free-Rider and Quasi Free-Rider mechanisms showing the greatest such behavior. All three mechanisms yield mean quantities of a public good that are significantly greater than the free-rider quantity. However, the Auction mechanism provides a mean quantity of the public good which is significantly larger than that of the other two procedures, and closer to the Lindahl optimal quantity.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Public Good; Auction Mechanism; Pure Public Good; Facility Size (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1981
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-05090-1_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-05090-1_5

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