On the Difficulty of Attaining Distributional Goals With Imperfect Information About Consumers

Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin

A chapter in Measurement in Public Choice, 1981, pp 86-96 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Recently, mechanisms which overcome the free rider problem and achieve Pareto optimality under imperfect information have been constructed. In this paper we provide various impossibility theorems which show the difficulty of achieving distributional goals when consumers’ tastes are unknown. The results are developed for a particular game theoretic solution concept, that of dominant strategy; they could be extended if, instead, Bayesian equilibrium were the solution concept. As a way out we propose a second-best approach to welfare optimization.

Keywords: Public Good; Solution Concept; Dominant Strategy; Social Welfare Function; Private Good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1981
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-05090-1_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-05090-1_7

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