Too Much Power at the Top?

Kevin Page
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Kevin Page: The Guardian

Chapter 10 in Management Accountability and Corporate Governance, 1982, pp 114-125 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract Kevin Page concentrates on the American investment scene, where ‘a handful of investment managers in New York offices can ultimately control industrial and economic policy, the appointment of managers, corporate objectives and merger strategy by use of their vast voting rights in the top US companies’.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Mutual Fund; Pension Fund; Venture Capital Fund; Trust Department (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1982
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-05944-7_10

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-05944-7_10

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